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B efore turning to the m ain subject o f this paper, it m ay be 
advisable to take a b r ie f  look at the background o f the problem .
A survey o f the m ost im portant facts relating to our m ost urgent, 
and seem ingly insoluble, w orld population problem  w ill allow  us 
to see the sp ecific  relationships between population growth and 
socia l and econom ic developm ent in the right persp ective .
Recently the w oddpopulation passed the 3,000 m illion  m ark .
It is growing at an unprecedented and accelerating rate o f (1 .7  
percent p. a . ). This rate o f  in crea se , if continued, w ill lead to 
a doubling o f the w orld population in about 40 y ea rs . By the year 
2000, when humanity w ill number 6,000 m illion , growth rates 
w ill be such (on the basis o f rather conservative estim ates) that 
the population w ill double again in only 23 y ea rs .
It is estim ated that over 100 m illion  babies w ere born  in the 
w orld during 1959, and that som e 50 m illion  people died •• The 
resulting annual increase o f about 50 m illion  alm ost equals the 
entire population o f the United Kingdom.
A ccord ing to carefu l estim ates by the Food and A gricu ltural 
Organization o f the United States, m ore  than half o f the human race  
do not get enough to eat. In a recent period  (1947-53) the w orld 's  
food production increased by 8%, a rem arkable achievem ent for  
agriculture and one not lik ely  to be repeated. But during the same 
seven years the w orld 's  population in creased  by 11%; at the end of 
the period humanity was hungrier than at its beginning. In forty  
years there w ill be twice as many people, and with the best su c ­
cess that m ay reasonably be expected with regard to food production; 
there m ay be twice as m uch food available; so still m ore  than half 
the people w ill be underfed, but the absolute number then w ill be 
twice as great.
1, United Nations. Demographic Yearbook, 1959. New York.
Cio tre for Applied Social Sciences 
University of Natal 
King George V Avenue 
Durban 4001 
I South Africa
2Even if one is relatively  optim istic about actual and potential 
natural resou rces  and the developm ent and spread o f technology and 
their e ffect on food production and other n ecessities  o f life , it is 
obvious that present rates o f in crease cannot continue for  any 
length of tixxie. Either birth rates m ust be reduced or death rates 
m ust increase» It is sim ple arithm etic that if  the current rates of 
births and deaths, and the resulting geom etric  rate o f in crease , 
are continued into the future, human reproduction  w ill com pletely  
outrun any estim ate of production, no m atter how large  ^ •
The principle and the im plications are therefore c lea r : 
considering the w orld population as a whole, low death rates are 
incom patible with high birth rates in the long run. What about 
sh ort-term  developm ents? As recently  as 1953,. Colin Clark, 
assum ing a rate of in crease o f w orld population of 1.1%  for  1950 
and estim ating that the w orld could feed 12,000 m illion  people, 
concluded that population growth constituted no serious threat to 
m an 's existence on earth This assessm ent is extrem ely  short­
sighted, to say the least, in view o f the fact that a population o f 
12,000 m illion  could quite p ossib ly  be reached by  2023»
It is an unrealistic abstraction  to talk about the "w orld  
population prob lem ", or the increase of w orld population in relation  
to m ankind's capacity to feed, house and clothe a growing number 
o f peop le . Though we live in one w orld , there is no w orld govern ­
m ent which ca rr ies  responsib ility  fo r  providing a decent standard 
o f living fo r  its citizens. We have, rather, a ser ies  of national 
problem s ; each individual country is confronted with its own 
peculiar population prob lem . The problem  already stated is en ­
hanced by the v e ry  uneven distribution o f w orld population and 
reso u rce s . F or exam ple, A sia  has m ore than half o f the w orld 's  
population, but only one-fifth  o f the land area. The average 
number of arable acres per p erson  is  estim ated at only 0 .7  of an
2. A nsley J. C oale. "In creases in Expectations o f L ife and Popula­
tion Growth" in International Population C onference, Vienna 1959, 
p. 36. Coale says: "In about 6,500 years, i f  current growth co n . 
tinues, the descendants o f the present w orld  population would form  
a solid  sphere o f  live bodies expanding with a r adial v e locity  that, 
neglecting  relativity,'would equal the velocity  of l ig h t ."  Whether 
or not our growth rate is maintained fo r  a few years , or even 
centuries, ultim ately birth rates m ust fa ll or death rates go u p ."
3. Colin Clark, "Population Growth and Living Standards, Inter-  
national Labour Review , Aug. 1953.
3acre  in A sia  (0. 1 in Japan), com pared to 2 .9  acres in Northern 
A m erica , 4 .7  in Australia and Ney/ Zealand, 2 .6  in the U .S .S .R ., 
Northern A m erica  and the U .S .S *R . a lso  have vast tracts o f land 
suitable for agriculture which are not being cultivated, as w ell as 
large fo rest and m ineral r e se rv e s . In proportion  to its population, 
A sia  has a much sm aller share o f such resou rces . It is true that 
many o f the under-developed countries in A frican  and Latin A m erica  
have tremendous reserv es  o f unused natural re sou rces , but they lack  
the capital and technically  trained personnel to develop them . In 
fact, the distribution o f m an-m ade equipment and o f manpower 
suitable fo r  em ploym ent in an advanced m odern econom y is even 
m ore unequal than the distribution of natural re so u rce s .^ The 
W orld's great industrial installations are concentrated la rg e ly  in a 
few countries o f Europe and North A m erica , while the poor nations 
are handicapped by a lack o f the m ost sim ple tools and im plem ents, 
and a grave shortage o f personnel with even an elem entary education. 
Although the need for  a certain  m inim um  education is now generally  
recogn ized , the under-developed countries are still lagging far 
behind in this respect; fo r  exam ple, 79 per-cent of the population 
in Turkey, 85 percent in Egypt, and 90 percent in India are unable ' 
to read and w rite.
At the same tim e, population growth is m ost rap id  in the 
econom ica lly  under-developed areas where w ell over half the 
w orld 's  people now live in abject poverty . At least two thirds o f 
all the babies born  each year fir s t  see the light of day in A fr ica ,
A sia  and Latin A m erica . Latin A m erica  is growing faster than 
any other m ajor region  (at 2 .5  percent p .a .  in 1954-58). In 
certain  parts o f A fr ica  and Southern A sia , the population is 
growing alm ost equally fast (1 .9%  p .a . fo r  the whole o f A frica , 
and 1.8%  p .a . for A sia, excluding Japan). W estern Europe has 
the slow est growth (0 .6%  p .a . )  while the United States and the 
Soviet Union are increasing at about the w orld average. H owever, 
these figures conceal great variations in growth between the 
various countries. F or  exam ple, in A frica , Egypt, A lgeria ,
Tunisia and M orocco  now have an estim ated annual rate o f in crease 
o f between 2. 5 and 3% ; in A sia , India has a rate o f 2. 0 % ,mainland 
China 2 .5%  5, Indonesia 2 .5 % , C ey lon 2 .7 % , the Philippines 2 .8 % , 
Malaya 3%, and F orm osa  3 .5 % ; in Latin A m erica , an annual 
growth rate has been observed o f 3 .6%  fo r  Venezuella, 3 .4%  for  
M exico, 3 .3%  for Honduras, 2 .9%  for Costa R ica , 2 .5%  to 3 .0%
4. Cf. United Nations, Population Growth and the Standard o f Living 
in under-developed Countries, New York, 1954.
5. Cf. Roland P ressa t, "L a  Population de la Chine et son 
E con om ic", in Population, 1958.
4fo r  B raz il. A rate of 3% p. a. means doubling the population in 
24 years and a nineteenfold m ultiplication in a century if maintained. 
Such rates of increase are entirely  unheard of at any other period of 
human h istory . Enough Indian babies are being born  to add (nett of 
deaths) another New York City dto the world*s population every  
year, and enough Chinese babies to add another South A frica .
What about the im m ediate future? The very  conservative 
estim ates of the United Nations (assum ing some decline in fertility  
in the near future) expect the w orld population to grow m ore rapidly 
than at any time in h istory  during the next few decades. Growth w ill 
be fastest in those already overcrow ded, agrarian countries where 
levels o f living are low est and where no effective birth control is 
practiced . (M ost o f A sia  -  except Japan and Is ra e l-A fr ica  and 
trop ica l Latin A m erica ). A m ore m oderate rate of growth m ay be 
expected in the econom ica lly  mature countries where living levels 
are high and where fam ily  lim itation is now increasingly  practiced  
to control num bers. (A ll countries of Europe, and Soviet Union, 
the United States, Canada, Japan and the Temperate Zone countries 
o f Latin A m erica  and Oceania) Thus the gap between the "have" 
and "have-not" nations are bound to widen during the years ahead ; 
and not only as regards population and population growth but also in 
resp ect o f wealth, econom ic developm ent and standard of living.
This spectre, to m y mind, constitutes the greatest socia l, econom ic 
and politica l problem  with which man is confronted in the 20th 
Century. A recent United Nations report phrased the dilem m a in 
these w ords: "The growth of worid population during the next twenty- 
five years , therefore, has an im portance which transcends econom ic 
and socia l considerations. It is at the very  heart o f the problem  of 
our existence . . . . . "  7
Some authors com fort them selves with the idea that " it  has all 
happened b e fo re "  -  that there was a rapid expansion of population in 
Europe during the 19th Century ® , and that the problem  solved itse lf.
6. In 1900 there was one European fo r  every  two Asians ; by the year 
2000 there w ill probably be four Asians fo r  every  European and 
twice as many Latin A m ericans as Northern A m ericans.
7. United Nations, Report on the W orld Social Situation, New Y ork, 1957.
8. It has been estim ated that between 1750 and 1900 the population 
o f Europe and its em igrant o ff-sh oots  overseas increased 
nearly  fou r-fo ld .
5These people are deluding th em selves. Today's problem  o f the 
under-developed countries is entirely  d ifferent from  that o f the 
European countries a hundred years ago.
(1) F irs t , both the population and population density are incom parably 
greater in m ost o f the under -developed countries today than they w ere 
in Europe before  the Industrial B evolution.
(2) Second, the European birth  rate, even before  m odern  birth 
control m ethods w ere known, was w ell below  the present birth 
rates in under-developed countries.
(3) Third, in Europe the decline in the death rate did not precede 
econom ic developm ent but cam e about partly as a.consequence o f 
the im provem ent in living conditions and kept pace with this 
developm ent. M oreover, m ed ica l techniques and d isease  control 
m ethods, which are now both cheap and efficien t, have been im ­
ported to countries where they are a century or two ahead o f the 
way of life  of the people The fact is that m edical p rog ress  now 
enables m en to live longer on average without their standard of 
living being ra ised . M edical p rog ress  having gained a m arch  on 
econom ic p rog ress , it has becom e possib le  for m ore  people to 
live longer under w orse conditions.
(4) Fourth, overseas em igration  helped European countries 
during the 19th and early  20th Century to escape som e o f the 
econom ic difficulties to which the rapid growth o f their population 
m ight otherwise have led , be fore  high birth rates w ere adjusted to 
falling death rates. A ccord ing  to one estim ate, the population o f 
Europe in 1910 was 88 m illion  less  than it would have been i f  there 
had been no em igration  after 1800 *0. Today the densely  populated 
under-developed countries have hardly any opportunities to ease 
their difficulties by m eans o f em igration  :
(i) There are no longer any great "open  sp a ces" on earth 
with plentiful and inexpensive agricu ltural land such as fo r  exam ple, 
North and South A m erica , A ustralia  and New Zealand presented in 
the 19th Century.
(ii) The high cost o f  present-day  m igration , of transporting 
equipping and establishing agricu ltural settlers in new surroundings 
which m ay take large capital sums to prepare and m aintain.
9^  Cf. A .Sauvy, "The E conom ic, Social and P o litica l P rob lem s 
caused by  the Increase in W orld Population", in Humanity and 
Subsistence, Annales N estle, 1961, p . 31 
• C f. United Nations, Population Growth and the Standard of  Living 
in U nder-developed C ountries, p . 8, New Y ork , Í954.
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(iii) The demand fo r  im m igrants in countries of im m igra ­
tion is  large ly  fo r  skilled and sem i-sk illed  w orkers in industry 
and trade for which em igrants from  the over-populated countries 
do not qualify.
( iv )  Any potential m igration , which m ay be econom ica lly  
feasib le , w ill o ffer  no re lie f  in view of the very  large numbers 
required to have any e ffect on population trends in densely populated 
under -developed countries. Just to keep A s ia ’ s population stationary 
would require the em igration  o f som e 25 m illion  people per year -  
which is , o f cou rse , an absurdity under present-day  w orld conditions.
(v) There are severe restriction s on im m igrants in m o st  
countries both on the right o f entry and o f the types o f em ploym ent 
in which they m ay engage. The opinion is w idely held, and en ­
trenched in legislation , that su ccessfu l im m igration requires that 
the racia l and cultural background o f im m igrants should be sub­
stantially the same as that o f the country o f settlem ent.
5. F inally, population growth in many under-developed countries 
today exceed by  two or three tim es the rate o f increase in W estern 
Europe in the 19th Century. Am ongst others, rapid growth itse lf 
o ffers a severe obstacle to reducing fertility  in that it im pedes the 
socia l and econom ic changes that tend to reduce the birth rate ^  .
When considering the com plex  in ter-relationsh ips between two 
sets o f  factors (dem ographic trends and econom ic and socia l deve­
lopm ent) it is convenient from  an analytical point of view to treat 
fir s t  the influence o f one set on the other, and then to deal with 
influences in the opposite d irection . In discussing the relevant 
facts concerning population and natural and m an-m ade resou rces 
obtaining in under-developed countries, the m ain points relating to 
the influence o f  econom ic and socia l developm ent on population 
growth have already been touched on. This influence (of econom ic 
growth on dem ographic trends) m ust operate through one or m ore o f 
the three determinants of population growth, i . e . births, deaths and 
m igration . In recent tim es, the theory of "dem ographic transition" 
has been w idely accepted as a theoretica l fram e-w ork  which enables 
socia l scientists to com e to grips with the com plex  problem  of the 
inter-relationships between dem ographic, socia l and econom ic 
variab les . This theory, which is partly the outcome of efforts to 
reason  about the future course o f population trends in countries 
which are em erging from  a state of econom ic under-developm ent in 
the light of the dem ographic evolution experienced by  countries that 
have becom e industrialized^ and have adhieved relatively  high levels
11. Cf. A nsley J. Coale and Édgár M. H oover, Population growth and 
E conom ic Developm ent in L ow -Incom e Countries, Princeton,
1958, pp. 15 -  17.
7o f living, have been sum m arized as follow s
’ ’ The c la ss ica l econ om ic theory o f population growth (prim arily  
associated  with Malthus) held that any r ise  in incom es (particu larly  
among the p oorer  c la sses ) tended to in crease birth rates and (with 
m ore certainty and fo rce ) to decrease  death ra tes*1*
’'The course o f events since Malthus* tim e,h ow ever, has led 
to the gradual evolution o f a theory that postulates a m ore  com p lica ­
ted sequence of birth and death rates as typically  associated  with 
econom ic developm ent. It is som etim es term ed the theory  o f the 
"dem ographic transition" "  . . .
"In barest outline the sequence o f events, according to the 
theory of dem ographic transition, can be sum m arized as follow s :
The agrarian low -incom e econom y is characterized  by the high birth  
and death rates -  the birth rates relatively  stable, and the death rates 
fluctuating in response to varying fortunes. Then as the econom y 
changes its form  to a m ore interdependent and specia lized  m ark et- 
dominated econom y, the average death rate declin es. It continues to 
decline under the im pact o f better organization and im proving m edical 
knowledge and ca re . Somewhat later the birth rate begins to fa ll.
The two rates pursue a m ore or  less parallel downward course with 
the decline in the birth rate lagging behind. F inally, as further 
reductions in the death rate becom e harder to attain, the birth  rate 
again approaches equality with the death rate and a m ore  gradual 
rate o f growth is re -estab lish ed  with, how ever, low risks Of m ortality  
and sm all fam ilies as the ty p ica l pattern. M ortality rates are now 
relatively  stable from  year to year and birth  rates -  now responsive 
to voluntary decisions rather than to deeply imbedded custom s -m a y  
fluctuate from  year to year. This short descrip tion  fits the e x ­
perience o f m ost countries whose econom ies have undergone the 
kind o f reorganization  we have been calling econom ic developm ent.
The part o f the descrip tion  with the least certain  applicability is 
the characterization  of the final stage as a return to a condition o f 
only gradual g row th ."
"A  superficia l survey o f the dem ographic situation and apparent 
prospects in the low -in com e portions of the w orld gives reason  fo r  
doubting the applicability o f  the dem ographic transition  as an exact 
descrip tion  o f the likely  course o f events in these a r e a s ."
8The last paragraph is indeed an understatem ent. The m ain 
resons fo r  saying this have already been presented in discussing 
the fundamental d ifferences which exist between the situation in the 
under-developed countries today, and the dem ographic situation in 
Europe and E u rope-overseas a hundred to two hundred years ago. 
The weakness o f the theory lie s  not so much in its descrip tion  o f  
past events but in its value as an instrum ent to pred ict future 
o ccu rren ces . F o r  exam ple, there are clear indications that the 
repercu ssion s o f econom ic developm ent and a higher per capita 
incom e upon the birth rate m ay not be the same indifferent cultures. 
The m asses o f A sia , A fr ica  and trop ica l South A m erica  m ay react 
quite differently to econom ic developm ent, urbanization and indus­
trialization, even i f  we make the rather doubtful assum ption that in 
many p laces explosive population growth w ill not prevent a rise  in 
the standard o f liv ing. And then the question rem ains: What types 
and what degree o f change in econom ic conditions would be required 
and how m uch tim e would have to elapse before  birth rates would 
fall low enough to nearly balance the fast declining death rates ?
A few exam ples should suffice to illustrate this point. In T a iw an ^ , 
where death rates declined substantially before and during the last 
war under Japanese adm inistration, birth rates rem ained unchanged. 
In Ceylon, where death rates have declined consistently during the 
last forty  years from  about 30 per thousand to around 10 per 1000, 
there has been no important decline in fertility . In many countries 
such as Egypt^^ and-India there is no differential fertility
between country and city  (nor on such indices as occupation, p o s ­
session  o f land in ru ra l areas, or caste). A ccord ing  to the 1951 
census o f India, in T ravancore-C och in  the number o f children 
ever born  to women 45 and over who are still m arried  was 6 ,6  
among the rural population and 6. 4 among the urban population.
Much the same is true of our own non-white populatioh in this 
country -  Indians, Bantu and even C oloured. In a survey con ­
ducted in A lexandra Township, Johannesburg *6, the birth rate was 
found to be 44 .2  per 1000 in this urban group, which corresponds 
c lose ly  to estim ates for  all Bantu in South A fr ica . At the same time 
an infant m ortality  rate o f Í 31 was established, which re flects  the 
rapidly declining death rates under urban conditions.
13. Cf. George W .B arclay , Colonial Developm ent and Population in 
Taiwan, Princeton, 1954, p. 147 * "
14« Cf. M. A .E l-B a d ry , "Som e A spects o f  F ertility  in Egypt11, The 
Milbank M em orial Fund Quarterly, V olX X X IV , N o.l.p p . 22-43^
15. C f. K ingsley Davis, The Population o f India'and Pakistan, 
pp. 70-82, and the National Sample Survey, No. 7, Couple 
F ertility , Govt, of India, 1955.
16. L* T .B adenhorst and B . Unterhalter, nA  Survey o f F ertility  and
Infant M ortality in an Urban A frican  Community11, Population 
Studies, V ol. XV, No. 1 1961. —
9One m ay ask, what about Japan -  the only country in A sia  
which has been able to m odernize its econom y and go far towards 
making the dem ographic transition? As a resu lt o f im m ense 
effort in the field  o f  industrialization and urbanization as w ell as 
agricu lture, and very  drastic  m easures in birth control (s te r il i ­
zation and abortion for econom ic reason s) Japan has reduced her 
birth rate from about 40 per thousand to about 19 per 1000 since 
1920, The same p rocesses  how ever, have led to a reduction in 
her death rate from  about 19 to 8 per 1000, which -  in spite of 
w ell over a m illion  legal abortions per year -  still resu lts in an 
annual growth rate o f 1. 1 percent p .a .  M oreover, "not even the 
m ost optim istic view o f India's possib le  econ om ic developm ent 
during the next thirty years would entail the achievem ent o f a 
degree of industrialization or the achievem ent o f leve ls  o f incom e 
like those prevailing in Japan in the l920 ,s M By 1930, nearly  
80 percent o f Japan’ s net output (and 50 percent o f  its labour 
fo rce ) could be credited to the non-agricu ltural sectors  o f the 
economy*®. In India, 83 per cent o f the population still derive 
their livelihood from  agricu lture. In fact, we can conclude this 
d iscussion  by stating em phatically that it is highly questionable 
whether the soc ia l and econom ic change likely  to take place in 
the next twenty or thirty years in countries such as India, China, 
Indonesia, Malaya, Egypt, Pakistan, m ost parts o f A fr ica  and 
trop ica l Latin A m erica , w ill have any great e ffect on fertility .
We m ust now look  at-the other side o f the p ictu re : How does 
population a ffect econom ic growth and the standard o f liv ing?
M ore p rec ise ly , how do dem ographic trends influence the per capita 
incom e o f the population in under-developed countries?
Space does not allow  a system atic survey o f the treatm ent o f 
this subject in econ om ic theory since Malthus, fo r  exam ple, the 
c la ss ica l school (particu larly  Adam Smith and David B icardo), the 
n e o -c la ss ica l econom ists (A lfred M arshall), the stagnation theo­
rists  (Keynes and his su cce ss o rs ) and the work o f econom ists like 
Schumpeter, Hansen, H arrod and Dom ar with their varied approaches 
to the establishm ent and maintenance o f econ om ic growth, taking 
population ch aracteristics  into account *9,
17. Cf. A nsley J. Coale and Edgar M .H oover, op. cit p .5 8 .
18. Cf. W illiam  W. Lockw ood, The E conom ic Developm ent o f Japan, 
Princeton, 1954, p. 103.
19. Cf. V incent Heath Whitney, "Population  in Theories o f E conom ic
D evelopm ent" in International Population C onference, Vienna, 
1959, p . 149 ff. ‘
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Neither w ill an attempt be made here to set forth the m ore recent 
attempts by dem ographers and econom ists to arrive  at a m ore 
sp ecific  definition o f the relationship o f population variables to 
other variables in the p rocess  of developm ent, (e. g. Spengler,
Coale, Leibenstein, Notestein, Belshaw, Sauvy, Stolnitz). We w ill 
focus our attention m erely  on a few illustrative exam ples of how 
certain  important dem ographic factors hinder econom ic develop­
m ent and a r ise  in per capita incom e in under-developed countries. 
(Parenthetically, I m ay just say that there is a great need fear the 
developm ent o f an integrated dem ographic and econ om ic theory in 
this field -  one which w ill lead to a m ore p recise  statement o f 
the d irect and indirect effects of population variab les upon other 
co-ex istin g  variables that are co llectiv e ly  the ultimate determinants 
o f econom ic growth). /
Let us first consider the question o f population size in relation  
to per capita incom e in under-developed countries. We have already 
re ferred  to the great numbers in m ost of the under-developed 
countries and their proportionately sm all share o f natural resou rces . 
In particu lar, these countries su ffer from  an excessive  density of 
agrarian population in relation  to arable land. This difficulty exists 
not only in g ross ly  over-crow d ed  A sia  but also in m ost countries 
o f A fr ica  and Latin A m erica , where large amounts of unused land 
is available, but often uninhabited fo r  various reasons ^0, The 
relative shortage o f land in a densely populated agricultural country 
ham pers the achievem ent of an adequate level o f living in two 
im portant w ays. One, the abundance of labour encourages the use 
o f methods of production which require m uch labour to produce a 
sm all return (the princip le o f diminishing returns). Secondly, the 
sm all size o f farm s lim its the application o f advanced techniques 
which are usually only possib le  when used on a large sca le  (econ o­
m ies o f sca le ). Both these forces  tend towards reduced per capita 
incom e •
The theory of optimum population -  which is nothing but an 
ex erc ise  in com parative econom ic statics -  has been cr it ic ized  for 
over-em phasizing the ro le  of lim ited and fixed land as a factor of 
production and la rge ly  ignoring the state of knowledge and skill o f 
the population. N eglecting fo r  a m om ent the e ffect o f a change in 
other factors o f production (notably capital) on the point of d im ini­
shing returns, it should be pointed out that in m ost econ om ica lly
20. In many parts o f  Latin A m erica  and A fr ica  there are m ore  than 
200 persons dependent on agriculture per square m ile  o f arable land.
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under-developed countries, im proving techniques and developing 
the sk ills of the people present ah even m ore  d ifficult problem  than 
the relative shortage o f land. M ost o f the poor, densely  populated 
countries are at least ar backward soc ia lly  as they are econ om ica l­
ly , and in a large population living at a subsistence leve l education 
and training, esp ecia lly  if  they are to be spread evenly over the 
population, are slow , costly  and d ifficu lt. Ignorance, illiteracy , 
superstition, traditionalism  and resistance to socia l change is 
extrem ely  hard to overcom e in the face o f .low per capita incom e 
and a chronic shortage of capital with land in lim ited.and fixed 
supply.
A m ore  important aspect o f the relationship between population 
and so c io -e con om ic  developm ent (com pletely  ignored in optimum 
population analysis) is the e ffects  over tim e o f changes in the size 
o f population, irresp ective  o f whether the population at any point o f 
tim e is too sm all or too la rg e .
We have seen  that m ost o f the under-developed countries are 
characterized  by low average incom e, low levels o f education, of 
literacy , of investm ent and saving, and o f foreign  trade. A t the 
same time birth  rates are high (40 or m ore per 1000) and death 
rates low or falling, resulting in v ery  high growth rates o f  2 or 3 
percent per y ea r . Perhaps the m ost significant aspect o f the e ffect 
o f population growth per se on .econom ic developm ent is that the 
faster the population grow s, the m ore investments are n ecessa ry  
to keep up or im prove a given leve l of per capita production . With 
a constant population, it is n ecessa ry  only to replace w orn out or 
obsolete equipment to maintain the leve l o f p er  capita  output.
In a fast growing population, a large additional investm ent is 
n ecessa ry  to maintain the sam e average amount of equipment per 
w ork er. Any im provem ent in equipment which m ay lead to an 
in crease  in average output and ultim ately to econ om ic growth, can 
only be accom plished by further investm ent, over and above what 
is required by the growth of population. M oreover, the additional 
investm ent required to ra ise  pér capita output can m ore  easily  be 
saved in an under-developed country with a slow er rate of in crease  
than with a higher growth rate. A large proportion  o f potential 
savings in countries of high fertility  n ecessa rily  goes towards food 
and other n ecessities  for the increasing number of children. And 
by no m eans all o f what the people are able to save out o f their 
m eagre incom es is actually invested in productive investm ents.
- ■ ■ ■  ■ '
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The concept o f  the "capital-output”  or "in vestm en t-in com e" 
ra tio  has been devised to illu stra te  the relationship between popu­
lation  growth and econ om ic developm ent^*. If the ratio o f  capital 
stock  to  current annual output is  3 to  1, i .  e . three units o f  capital 
are  required to produce one unit o f  incom e, then this m eans that 
a population growing at 1% p. a . m ust invest 3% of current output 
ju st to maintain its per capita incom e, and one growing at 3% p .a .  
m ust invest 9% of current output. (This is assum ing that there is 
no technical im provem ent and only capital and labour enters into 
production). M ost o f  the under-developed countries have a rate of 
investm ent w ell below  9% of production, which m eans inability to 
keep up the average equipment per w ork er. But if  incom e per 
capita is to be ra ise d , say by 2%, then in a population growing at 
3% p .a . no less  than 18% o f current output m ust be saved and 
invested.
Another illustration  o f how population growth im pedes econ o­
m ic  developm ent is the astronom ical absolute amounts o f investment 
which would be required to provide the u nder-developed  countries 
with enough equipment to perm it a "sa tis fa ctory ”  level o f per capita 
production under current growth conditions F or exam ple to
equip all A sia  with an average o f about R 1,400 worth o f m achinery 
and tools per w orker would cost an amount equal to three tim es the 
national incom e o f  the United States. Again, it has been estim ated 
that R360,000,000,000 worth o f equipment would be needed to ra ise  
the average output per w orker in the m ajor part o f A sia  to the level 
that Japan had reached before  the last w ar.
I do not have time to d iscuss the delicate politica l problem s 
involved in the developm ent o f  the poor countries and in particu lar, 
the difficulties and possib ilities  o f obtaining badly needed capital 
via foreign  aid and through the expansion o f inter national trade
21. C f. Jan Tinbergen: The Design o f Developm ent, International 
Bank fo r  R econstruction  and Development, New Y ork, 1955.
22. United Nations: Population Growth and the Standard o f Living 
in U nder-developed Countries, Population Studies, No. 20,
New York, 1954. See a lso  United Nations, Analyses and P r o je c -  
tions o f  E conom ic Development, New York, 1955.
23. C f. G. H aberler, "Population P ressu re  and E conom ic P o licy  
in Developed and U nder-developed countries", in Humanity 
and Subsistance, Annales N estle, 1961, pp. 63-73.
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1 only want to stress in passing that there is little hope that these 
sources of capital w ill suffice to initiate and maintain econ om ic 
developm ent in backward a rea s . F or example it has been ca lcu ­
lated that between 4 .4  and 13.2%  of the national incom e o f deve ­
loped countries would have to be transferred  annually to the under­
developed countries in order to double their per capita incom e in 
35 y e a r s ^ .  In view of the underlying assumptions about the 
capital coefficien t and prospective rates o f population growth, this 
m ay be considered a conservative estim ate. But let us com pare 
with this the actual proportions of national incom e invested overseas 
in recent years by som e of the leading countries. Since the last war 
France has invested in its overseas terr ito ries  about 1 to 1 .5%  o f 
its national incom e; all other developed countries have rem ained 
w ell below  this level, including the United States which have spent 
about 0 .5%  o f its national incom e on foreign  aid
The third factor which enters into an analysis o f  the e ffect o f 
population growth on so c io -e co n o m ic  developm ent is the age com po­
sition of the population. The age distribution o f a population is 
profoundly affected by births and deaths (in a closed  population) and 
the m ain determ ining factor is the past course of fertility . High 
fertility , such as we have in all under-developed countries, m eans 
many children per adult. In addition, decreases  in m ortality  have 
a rein forcing e ffect on the youthful age structure. The resu lt is 
that all low -incom e countries, as a consequence o f their high birth 
rates and declining m ortality , have a broad ly -based  and sharply 
tapering age pyram id.
The percentage of children under 15 years of age in the under­
developed countries o f A sia, A fr ica  and L atin  A m erica  is usually 
in the order o f  40 percent or  m ore  of the total population, while the 
proportion  in European countries is only between 20 and 30 percent. 
This means a heavy burden of dependent children for  the working 
population, which m akes it ex trem ely  difficult if  not im possib le  for  
them to accumulate savings, the prerequ isite  to capital form ation  
and investm ent. It a lso  com plicates the problem  of providing the 
children with the education that is essential for soc ia l and econ om ic
24. Cf. Leon Tabah, Le P roblem e Population- Livestissernent -  
Niveau de Vie. dans le Pays Sous -  D eveloppes, in Le T iers 
Monde by G eorges Balandier, P a r is , 1956.
25. Cf. W. Brand, **The W orld Population P rob lem 1*, in International 
Population Conference, Vienna, 1959, p . 28
advancement in the long run. In any case greater expenditures on 
schooling and child w elfare program m es m ust inevitably reduce the 
availability o f  capital for increasing the productivity o f labour.
The high childhood m ortality  rates in under-developed coun­
tries cause expenditures on ^children who, because they die, make 
no contribution at a later time to the econom y. So it seem s that 
the falling m ortality  at younger ages, allowing m ore children to 
survive to adulthood, would m ean an im provem ent in the burden of 
dependency and thus a saving in m aterial re sou rces . This is a 
delusion. Longer average life  spans m ean that m ore m ales w ill 
survive to becom e fathers and m ore fem ales w ill attain or com ­
plete their reproductive period . And if  the high birth rates remained 
unchanged, any addition to the adult population im plies a proportion ­
ate increase in the number o f births and of children. If death rates 
fall, while birth rates rem ain constant, the size o f each su ccessive  
generation w ill be la rger  but the average number o f dependent 
children per adult w ill be practica lly  unchanged
In fact analysis shows that the increase in the number of 
children is indeed somewhat greater than the rise  in the number of 
w orkers ^ • So while it is true that a decrease  in childhood m orta ­
lity  w ill lead to a la rger  population at the working ages than would 
otherwise have resulted, it produces an even greater r ise  in the 
number of children whom the people o f productive age must support. 
This is the present situation of the under-developed countries 
generally, and they w ill continue to suffer the econom ic handicap 
o f heavy childhood dependency as long as their present high birth 
rates continue.
26. F or an analysis o f the relative e ffects  o f m ortality  and fertility  
decreases on age com position, see F .L o r im e r , "Dynam ics o f 
age structure in a Population with Initially High F ertility  and 
M ortality", in United Nations, Population Bulletin, No. 1,
pp. 31 -  41.
27. Gf. A . J. Coale, "The E ffect o f D eclines in M ortality on 
Age D istribution", in Trends and D ifferentials in M ortality 
Milbank M em orial Fund, New Y ork, 1956, pp. 125-132.
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Let us conclude this survey o f the w orld population problem  
by quoting from  a recent address by Sir Charles Darwin :
“ When we circum vented the Law o f the N on-inheritance o f 
Acquired Characters we raised man from  being m ere ly  the 
m ost efficien t m em ber o f the animal kingdom into being its 
m aster. We have got to d iscov er  a way o f circum venting 
another natural law, that o f the universal tendency of all 
species to m ultiply in num bers, if we are to retain the good 
things o f the w orld in anything like their present fo rm .
The difficulties are enorm ous, and I can only end by 
expressing the hope that they w ill be so lved"
28. C f. "The Future Numbers o f 
Subsistence, Annales N estle,
Mankind", in Humanity and 
Switzerland, 1961.
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